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- 回复 法律零碎
- 旧指桃色新闻，明星名人的负评较多，通常是指影视及娱乐界某明星自身与周边异性或同性之间的情色故事。一般来说绯闻发生时，绯闻的男女主角都会有新作品（如新歌发片），一般而言是利用绯闻来炒作。
The old refers to peach-colored news. Star celebrities have more negative reviews, usually referring to the erotic stories between a star in the film and entertainment industry and the surrounding heterosexual or homosexual. Generally speaking, when a scandal occurs, the male and female protagonists of the scandal will have new works (such as new song releases), and generally use the scandal to hype.
- 回复 法律零碎
- MILKOVICH v. LORAIN JOURNAL CO. ET AL., 110 S. Ct. 2695, 497 U.S. 1 (U.S. 06/21/1990)
Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 284-286 (1974) (use of the word "traitor" in literary definition of a union "scab" not basis for a defamation action under federal labor law since used "in a loose, figurative sense" and was "merely rhetorical hyperbole, a lusty and imaginative expression of the contempt felt by union members").
Next, the Bresler-Letter Carriers-Falwell line of cases provides protection for statements that cannot "reasonably [be] interpreted as stating actual facts" about an individual. Falwell, 485 U.S., at 50. This provides assurance that public debate will not suffer for lack of "imaginative expression" or the "rhetorical hyperbole" which has traditionally added much to the discourse of our Nation. See id., at 53-55.
- 回复 法律零碎
- In Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Assn., Inc. v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970), a real estate developer had engaged in negotiations with a local city council for a zoning variance on certain of his land, while simultaneously negotiating with the city on other land the city wished to purchase from him. A local newspaper published certain articles stating that some people had characterized the developer's negotiating position as "blackmail," and the developer sued for libel. Rejecting a contention that liability could be premised on the notion that the word "blackmail" implied the developer had committed the actual crime of blackmail, we held that "the imposition of liability on such a basis was constitutionally impermissible -- that as a matter of constitutional law, the word 'blackmail' in these circumstances was not slander when spoken, and not libel when reported in the Greenbelt News Review." Id., at 13. Noting that the published reports "were accurate and full," the Court reasoned that "even the most careless reader must have perceived that the word was no more than rhetorical hyperbole, a vigorous epithet used by those who considered [the developer's] negotiating position extremely unreasonable." Id., at 13-14. See also Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988) (First Amendment precluded recovery under state emotional distress action for ad parody which "could not reasonably have been interpreted as stating actual facts about the public figure involved");
- 回复 法律零碎
- Levesque v. Doocy, 560 F.3d 82 (1st Cir. 03/19/2009) ----
We also agree that the defendants' references to an "anti-ham response plan" were not defamatory. Statements that contain "imaginative expression" or "rhetorical hyperbole" are protected.
- 回复 法律零碎
- Riley v. Harr, 292 F.3d 282 (1st Cir. 06/11/2002) ---
Reading Statement G in context, it is unmistakable that Neville's purpose in describing Riley as "the guy who killed your kids" is to inspire Schlichtmann to conduct a more forceful examination of Riley, and that Harr's purpose in reporting this episode is to capture the reaction of Schlichtmann's colleagues to his poor performance that day. In a sense, Statement G is "rhetorical hyperbole, a vigorous epithet" used by Neville to arouse Schlichtmann's fighting spirit. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 17 (quoting Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Assn., Inc. v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 13-14 (1970)). "[T]he First Amendment protects the 'rhetorical hyperbole' and 'imaginative expression' that enlivens writers' prose." Partington, 56 F.3d at 1157 (quoting Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 20).
- 回复 法律零碎
- However, in contrast to Greenbelt, where the court concluded that the defendant's use of the word "blackmail" was not meant as a literal accusation that the plaintiff had committed the crime of blackmail, the Anderson plaintiffs did contend that Riley's tannery, by causing TCE to enter the Woburn water supply, had "killed" their children. Greenbelt, 398 U.S. at 14; see also Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 285 (1974) (description of plaintiff as a "traitor" was not a literal accusation that plaintiff had committed the crime of treason). Even so, Statement G is non-actionable for the same reasons that the statements discussed supra, charging Riley with giving false testimony, are non-actionable. Having disclosed the facts upon which Statement G is based, Harr is entitled to report Neville's view that Riley's actions had caused the death of the plaintiffs' children. Phantom Touring, 953 F.2d at 730.
- 回复 法律零碎
- Brosnahan v. City of Somerville, 18-P-932 (Mass.App. 10/23/2019)
Tech Plus, Inc. v. Ansel, 59 Mass. App. Ct. 12, 26 (2003). Even in the light most favorable to Brosnahan, a reasonable listener would not have understood this statement as an assertion of fact about her as opposed to "rhetorical hyperbole." See id. at 25 (employee's statements that his supervisor was "sick," "mentally ill," and "lived with two hundred cats" could not be reasonably understood as factual assertions as opposed to rhetorical hyperbole).
- 回复 法律零碎
- Tech Plus, Inc. v. Ansel, 59 Mass.App.Ct. 12, 793 N.E.2d 1256 (Mass.App. 08/21/2003)
In view of all the foregoing circumstances, we conclude that Michael's alleged assertions that Piper was anti-Semitic, had told anti-Semitic jokes in his presence, and was constantly persecuting him because of his Jewish heritage constituted assertions of fact, rather than constitutionally protected expressions of opinion. They, therefore, could provide the basis for a defamation claim. See King v. Globe Newspaper Co., supra at 717, and cases cited. See also Ward v. Zelikovsky, supra at 531-532 ("The higher the 'fact content' of a statement, the more likely that the statement will be actionable"); Buckley v. Littell, 539 F.2d 882, 884-885 & n.1 (2d Cir. 1976) (statement that journalist had lied about several persons constituted actionable assertion of fact, whereas statement that journalist was "fascist" did not); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 565 (1977).
- 回复 法律零碎
- Levesque v. Doocy, 560 F.3d 82 (1st Cir. 03/19/2009)
The district court held that a jury could find defamatory the defendants' attribution to Levesque of two false and absurd quotations - - "ham is not a toy" and "it's akin to making these kids feel like they're being shot at back in Mogadishu and being starved to death" -- along with repeated references to a "ham sandwich" which included a recreation of the incident. The court found that the defendants' statements that Levesque and the Lewiston Middle School considered the incident to be a potential "hate crime" and the use of the term "anti- ham response plan" were not defamatory, concluding that the former was substantially true and the latter was rhetorical hyperbole.
- 回复 法律零碎
- Levesque v. Doocy, 560 F.3d 82 (1st Cir. 03/19/2009)
We also agree that the defendants' references to an "anti-ham response plan" were not defamatory. Statements that contain "imaginative expression" or "rhetorical hyperbole" are protected. Veilleux, 206 F.3d at 115 (citing Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 20); Levinsky's, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 127 F.3d 122, 127 (1st Cir. 1997)). Here, the defendants augmented Washuk's accurate reporting -- "the [Center] is working with the school to create a response plan" -- with Plagman's creative flourish -- "the [Center is] working with the school to create an anti-ham 'response plan.'" This loosely rhyming phrase provided the defendants with a succinct, perhaps distasteful, jingle through which to express their derision, but such a device does not qualify as a provably false statement, capable of a defamatory nature. Further, it "cannot reasonably be interpreted as stating actual facts about [Levesque]," Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 20 (internal quotations and citation omitted).
- 回复 法律零碎
- Riley v. Harr, 292 F.3d 282 (1st Cir. 06/11/2002)
Reading Statement G in context, it is unmistakable that Neville's purpose in describing Riley as "the guy who killed your kids" is to inspire Schlichtmann to conduct a more forceful examination of Riley, and that Harr's purpose in reporting this episode is to capture the reaction of Schlichtmann's colleagues to his poor performance that day. In a sense, Statement G is "rhetorical hyperbole, a vigorous epithet" used by Neville to arouse Schlichtmann's fighting spirit. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 17 (quoting Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Assn., Inc. v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 13-14 (1970)). "[T]he First Amendment protects the 'rhetorical hyperbole' and 'imaginative expression' that enlivens writers' prose." Partington, 56 F.3d at 1157 (quoting Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 20).
- 回复 法律零碎
- Intercity Maintenance Company v. Local 254, Service Employees International Union, 241 F.3d 82 (1st Cir. 03/02/2001)
The court also rightly noted that certain other statements - characterizing Intercity as a "sweatshop," a "plague," and an "infestation," and Bouthillette as a "bloodsucking, plantation-minded boss" - were non-actionable opinion, "rhetorical hyperbole" typical of labor disputes and protected under the LMRA. Id. at 503.
- 回复 法律零碎
- Hoops v. Sinram, 2017-30016 (Mass. 01/06/2017)
Any claim that words of this nature, falsely attributed, related only to "the commission of the crime of harassment (see, Penal Law § 240.25; People v Dorns, 88 Misc.2d 1064, 390 N.Y.S.2d 546 [NY Just Ct 1976] [threats to kill]), "Harassment is a relatively minor offense in the New York Penal Law-not even a misdemeanor-and thus the harm to the reputation of a person falsely accused of committing harassment would be correspondingly insubstantial. Hence, even if we agreed with plaintiff that the statement would not have been construed by the listeners as rhetorical hyperbole, the cause of action must nevertheless be dismissed because it is not [libelous] per se to claim that someone committed harassment" (Liberman v Gelstein, 80 N.Y.2d 429, 590 N.Y.S.2d 857');">590 N.Y.S.2d 857).
- 回复 法律零碎
- Ayyadurai v. Floor64, Inc., Civil Action 17-10011-FDS (D.Mass. 09/06/2017) (need to read whole)
Several of the statements at issue suggest that plaintiff's claim to have invented e-mail is “fraudulent” or that plaintiff is a “fraud” or a “charlatan.” (See, e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 36(a), 37(c), 46(e)).
...
Courts have repeatedly held that language such as “fraud, ” “snake-oil job, ” “rip-off, ” and “scam” is generally protected as hyperbolic speech. See Phantom Touring, 953 F.2d at 728; McCabe, 814 F.2d at 841-42; Paterson v. Little, Brown & Co., 502 F.Supp.2d 1124, 1135 (W.D. Wash. 2007). In context, no reasonable reader would interpret the references to plaintiff's claim as “fraudulent” to suggest that plaintiff actually committed a fraud-that is, that he made a false statement, with knowledge of its falsity, for the purpose of inducing another to act on the representation, where the other relied on that representation to his or her detriment. It is clear, particularly from the surrounding language describing plaintiff's claims as “bogus” or “easily debunked, ” that the articles are simply using colorful and figurative language and are not making any fact-based accusation that plaintiff has actually committed a fraud. (See, e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 36(a), 37(d)).
- 回复 法律零碎
- Tech Plus, Inc. v. Ansel, 59 Mass.App.Ct. 12, 793 N.E.2d 1256 (Mass.App. 08/21/2003)
We, therefore, conclude that the judge erred in determining that the alleged statements about Piper being anti-Semitic and having persecuted Michael because of his Jewish heritage constituted nonactionable opinion merely because they concerned Piper's alleged state of mind. See Ward v. Zelikovsky, 136 N.J. 516, 538 (1994) (accusation of bigotry may be actionable where it is made "in such manner or under such circumstances as would fairly lead a reasonable listener to conclude that [the person making the accusation] had knowledge of specific facts supporting the conclusory accusation"); Annot., Imputation of Alleged Objectionable Political or Social Beliefs or Principles as Defamation, 62 A.L.R. 4th 314, 465-475 (1988) (collecting additional cases). A given state of mind is a fact that can be proved like any other and, indeed, is proved in every criminal prosecution.
- 回复 法律零碎
- Tech Plus, Inc. v. Ansel, 59 Mass.App.Ct. 12, 793 N.E.2d 1256 (Mass.App. 08/21/2003)
Here, there was evidence in the summary judgment record [Note 9] that Michael not only had asserted generally that Piper was anti-Semitic but also, as purported factual support for that statement, had asserted that Piper had told anti-Semitic jokes in his presence and was "constantly persecuting" him because of his Jewish heritage. These latter statements plainly alleged that Piper had taken concrete (albeit unspecified) actions against Michael because of his Jewish heritage. See Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1685 (1993) (word "persecute" means "to cause to suffer . . . because of belief [as in a religion]"). "There was neither imprecision in meaning nor anything in the context of the [statements] that suggested that [the statements were] not factual." See King v. Globe Newspaper Co., 400 Mass. 705 , 717 (1987).
- 回复 法律零碎
- Tech Plus, Inc. v. Ansel, 59 Mass.App.Ct. 12, 793 N.E.2d 1256 (Mass.App. 08/21/2003)
Moreover, because the statements concerned a characteristic or qualification Piper needed to have to be a successful sales agent, i.e., an ability to deal with, and attract as customers, persons of all religions and ethnic backgrounds, we conclude that they are actionable without proof of any special damages in the form of economic loss or harm. See Ravnikar v. Bogojavlensky, 438 Mass. 627 , 630 (2003). See also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 573 comment c (1977) ("Statements concerning merchants that question their solvency or honesty in business come within the rule stated in this Section [permitting recovery without proof of special harm], as do statements charging any other quality that would have a direct tendency to alienate custom"). Hence, unlike the situation with the intentional interference and c. 93A claims, the plaintiffs were not precluded from proceeding with their defamation claims merely because they could not produce any evidence that they had suffered economic harm as a result of the defendants' conduct. See Ravnikar v. Bogojavlensky, supra.
- 回复 法律零碎
- the Record Appendix:
Docket Sheet
Plaintiff's Complaint;
Defendant's Answer;
Plaintiff's Motion for amended complaint;
Defendant's Opposition to motion for amended complaint;
Plaintiff's Reply to defendant's opposition to motion for amended complaint; ;
Plaintiff's Reply to defendant's answer to the complaint;
Defendant's Motion for judgment on the pleadings and Memorandum ;
Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
Defendant's Reply to plaintiff's opposition to Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
Plaintiff's Reply/Sur-reply
Judge Janice Howe's MEMORANDUM & ORDER
- 回复 法律零碎
- Of course, a statement is not actionable "unless in a given context it reasonably can be understood as having an easily ascertainable and objectively verifiable meaning." Levinsky's, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 127 F.3d 122, 129 (1st Cir. 1997). Statements that are merely "'imaginative expression'" or "'rhetorical hyperbole'" - in other words, statements that "no reasonable person would believe presented facts" - are not actionable. Id. at 128 (quoting Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 17, 20 (1990)).
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Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 8 F.3d 1222, 1227 (7th Cir. 1993). The Milkovich Court was careful not to discard the baby with the bath water:
while leaving some statements of opinion exposed, the Court reaffirmed the protection long afforded to "imaginative expression" and "rhetorical hyperbole." 497 U.S. at 17, 20. Thus, the First Amendment prohibits defamation actions based on loose, figurative language that no reasonable person would believe presented facts. See, e.g., Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 284-86 (1974) (holding that use of the word "traitor" to define a worker who crossed a picket line was not actionable); Greenbelt Coop. Publ'g Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 13-14 (1970) (holding that a newspaper's characterization of a developer's negotiating position as "blackmail" was not defamatory; the word was simply an epithet and, under the circumstances, did not suggest commission of a crime); Phantom Touring, 953 F.2d at 728 (calling a play "a rip-off, a fraud, a scandal, a snake-oil job" was mere hyperbole and, thus, constitutionally protected).
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- 回复 法律零碎
- We also agree that the defendants' references to an "anti-ham response plan" were not defamatory. Statements that contain "imaginative expression" or "rhetorical hyperbole" are protected. Veilleux, 206 F.3d at 115 (citing Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 20); Levinsky's, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 127 F.3d 122, 127 (1st Cir. 1997)). Here, the defendants augmented Washuk's accurate reporting -- "the [Center] is working with the school to create a response plan" -- with Plagman's creative flourish -- "the [Center is] working with the school to create an anti-ham 'response plan.'" This loosely rhyming phrase provided the defendants with a succinct, perhaps distasteful, jingle through which to express their derision, but such a device does not qualify as a provably false statement, capable of a defamatory nature. Further, it "cannot reasonably be interpreted as stating actual facts about [Levesque]," Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 20 (internal quotations and citation omitted).*fn6
